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I. INTRODUCTION 
In two recent interpretations of the North Carolina Constitution, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted and developed a unique form 
of intermediate scrutiny.  Blankenship v. Bartlett1 addressed a challenge 
to judicial districts under the state equal protection clause.2  King ex rel. 
Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort County Board of Education3 decided a state 
constitutional claim to alternative-education services during a 
disciplinary suspension.4  By applying intermediate scrutiny, the court 
resolved these two challenging state constitutional cases. 
As the name implies—and as the bench and bar know very well—
intermediate scrutiny falls somewhere “in between” strict scrutiny and 
rational basis review.5  Strict scrutiny, the “most exacting scrutiny,” is 
applied to suspect classifications and those impinging on fundamental 
                                                     
*  Senior Associate Justice and Research Assistant, Supreme Court of North Carolina.  
Nothing in this Article should be viewed as an opinion about the merits of pending or future cases 
that may come before the Supreme Court of North Carolina.  The purpose of this Article is to 
chronicle significant legal developments in North Carolina and place them in the academic literature 
on state constitutional adjudication.  The legal value vel non of these developments and their 
implications for future cases are left to the academy and other legal commentators.  We wish to 
thank Justice Robert H. Edmunds, Tom Davis, and Jake Parker for their assistance with this Article. 
 1. 681 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 2009). 
 2. See infra Part III.B. 
 3. 704 S.E.2d 259 (N.C. 2010). 
 4. See infra Part III.C. 
 5. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public 
Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 317 
(2010) (“In Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, for example, a U.S. court selects a particular 
standard of review based on the nature of the divisions the legislation in question draws between 
classes of individuals.  The more suspect the classification in question, the stricter the scrutiny 
employed by the tribunal.  Legislation of a general nature is subject only to rational basis review; 
more suspect classifications, such as gender, are subject to intermediate scrutiny; the most suspect 
classes, such as race, are subject to strict scrutiny.”). 
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rights6 and requires that the classification be necessary to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest.7  Challenges that do not involve 
fundamental rights or suspect classes receive rational basis review, the 
minimum level of scrutiny, which requires a challenged classification to 
be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”8  
Intermediate scrutiny, which has generally been applied to classifications 
based on gender and illegitimacy, requires a classification to be 
“substantially related to an important government objective.”9 
Through a review of Blankenship and King, this Article examines the 
origins of the particular form of intermediate scrutiny adopted by the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina.  The North Carolina Constitution is a 
much more detailed document than the U.S. Constitution and thus 
potentially raises more issues for judicial resolution.  In the words of a 
well-known scholar on the North Carolina Constitution, “[b]oth the 
grand declarations and the mundane details of a provision raise tricky 
problems of interpretation and implementation.”10  Blankenship and King 
adopted intermediate scrutiny to resolve the “tricky problems” presented 
by those cases. 
This Article proceeds by first providing background on the North 
Carolina Constitution and its interpretation by the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina.  This background section places North Carolina 
constitutional adjudication in the context of nationwide trends and 
models of state constitutional adjudication.  The Article then briefly 
reviews the application of intermediate scrutiny by federal and state 
courts before turning to Blankenship and King.  After examining the 
application of intermediate scrutiny in those two cases, potential benefits 
and drawbacks of intermediate scrutiny are catalogued.  This Article 
                                                     
 6. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Classifications based on race or national origin 
and classifications affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 7. Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d 203, 207 (N.C. 2001) (“If a regulation receives strict 
scrutiny, then the state must prove that the classification is necessary to advance a compelling 
government interest; otherwise, the statute is invalid.”). 
 8. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Rowe, 549 S.E.2d at 207 (“If a regulation draws any other 
classification, it receives only rational-basis scrutiny, and the party challenging the regulation must 
show that it bears no rational relationship to any legitimate government interest.  If the party cannot 
so prove, the regulation is valid.”). 
 9. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461; see also Rowe, 549 S.E.2d at 207 (“Other classifications, including 
gender and illegitimacy, trigger intermediate scrutiny, which requires the state to prove that the 
regulation is substantially related to an important government interest.”). 
 10. JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION, WITH HISTORY AND 
COMMENTARY, at xvi (1995). 
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concludes that intermediate scrutiny may represent a viable alternative in 
resolving state constitutional dilemmas. 
II. THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY 
THE COURTS 
A. A Brief History 
The State of North Carolina has had three constitutions.  The 
“Independence Constitution” of 1776 and its accompanying Declaration 
of Rights enshrined the principle of separation of powers, expressly 
declared the right of citizens to be free from governmental interference, 
and elaborated the basic structure of government.11  It placed most of the 
power in the hands of the state legislature and the property owners who 
were the only citizens entitled to vote.12  Extensive amendments in 1835 
reflected a westward shift in the political center of the state that resulted 
from frontier settlement.13 
The “Reconstruction Constitution” of 1868 was drafted following the 
Civil War according to the requirements of federal legislation.14  It 
included the 1776 constitution’s Declaration of Rights, strengthened the 
executive branch, expanded the right to vote, established a uniform court 
system, and elaborated the methods for taxation.15  Notably, a set of 
thirty amendments ratified in 1876 restored power to the state legislature 
that had been lost in the 1868 constitution.16 
The current constitution was adopted in 1970 and took effect in 
1971.17  It incorporated revisions recommended by a constitutional study 
commission chaired by a former chief justice of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina.18  The commission’s suggested revisions deleted 
obsolete or invalid provisions and consolidated and revised the 
constitutional text for clarity.19  “The 1971 Constitution . . . was not . . . a 
product of haste and social turmoil.  It was instead a good-government 
                                                     
 11. Id. at 1, 3–4; John L. Sanders, Our Constitutions: An Historical Perspective, in NORTH 
CAROLINA MANUAL: 1995–1996, at 136, 136 (Lisa A. Marcus ed., 1996). 
 12. See ORTH, supra note 10, at 1; Sanders, supra note 11, at 136. 
 13. See ORTH, supra note 10, at 1. 
 14. See id. at 12–13. 
 15. Id. at 13–14; Sanders, supra note 11, at 138. 
 16. ORTH, supra note 10, at 16. 
 17. Sanders, supra note 11, at 144. 
 18. Id. at 143. 
 19. See ORTH, supra note 10, at 20; Sanders, supra note 11, at 143–44. 
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measure, long matured and carefully crafted by the state’s lawyers and 
politicians, designed to consolidate and conserve the best features of the 
past, not to break with it.”20 
In general, amending state constitutions is easier than amending the 
U.S. Constitution, as plainly demonstrated by the numbers of 
amendments adopted.21  According to an estimate made in 1989, “[t]he 
present constitutions of the 50 states have been amended collectively in 
excess of 5300 times.”22  Averaged across the states, this represents 106 
amendments for each state.23  A slightly later study from 1998 estimates 
that “state constitutions on average contain over 120 constitutional 
amendments.”24 
Like other states, North Carolina’s constitution has been amended 
much more frequently than the U.S. Constitution.  For example, in the 
period between 1869 and 1968, there were ninety-seven proposed 
amendments to the 1868 constitution; of these, voters ratified sixty-nine 
and rejected the other twenty-eight.25  The frequency of amendments to 
the North Carolina Constitution has continued to the present day.  In the 
November 2010 elections, North Carolina voters approved an 
amendment that prevents convicted felons from running for the office of 
sheriff.26  In an indication of how quickly an amendment to the state 
constitution can pass, the state legislature had submitted the amendment 
in a session law passed on July 1, 2010,27 just four months before the 
election.  The next most recent amendments were presented during the 
2004 elections—all three amendments passed and, respectively, 
addressed the distribution of civil fines and forfeitures to public schools, 
expanded the terms of magistrate judges, and authorized self-financing 
bonds for public improvements.28 
                                                     
 20. ORTH, supra note 10, at 20. 
 21. See James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under State 
Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1329 (1989) (“State constitutions also are more easily 
amended than the federal constitution . . . .”). 
 22. Id. at 1329 n.143. 
 23. Of course, not all states have existed for the same amount of time.  For example, unless 
Alaska and Hawaii were amending their respective constitutions almost as frequently as other states 
amend statutory provisions, one would not expect their share of the total amendments to reach the 
same level as one of the original thirteen states. 
 24. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 10 (1998). 
 25. Sanders, supra note 11, at 142. 
 26. See Gary D. Robertson, Voters Approve Change to Ban Felons as Sheriff, NEWS & REC. 
(Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.news-record.com/content/2010/11/02/article/voters_ 
approve_change_to_ban_felons_as_sheriff. 
 27. See Act of July 1, 2010, 2010-2 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 24 (LexisNexis). 
 28. See Richard Craver, Voters OK Use of Self-Financing Bonds, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 4, 
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According to a 1998 scholarly appraisal, “the unamended text of the 
typical state constitution remains over three times as long as that of the 
federal Constitution.”29  A comparison of North Carolina’s constitution 
with the U.S. Constitution—including its twenty-seven amendments—
reveals that the North Carolina Constitution, at 17,082 words, is just over 
twice as long as the U.S. Constitution, at 7708 words.30  While word 
count does not necessarily translate directly into significant constitutional 
text, the larger size of the North Carolina Constitution is suggestive of 
more plentiful opportunities for litigants to make claims and for the 
judiciary to find guidance in resolving legal controversies.  As the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has explained, the North Carolina 
“Constitution is more detailed and specific than the federal Constitution 
in the protection of the rights of its citizens.”31 
                                                                                                                       
2004, at B1. 
 29. TARR, supra note 24, at 10. 
 30. This comparison was made by copying each constitution’s text into a Microsoft Word 
document and using that program’s word count feature.  The text of the North Carolina Constitution 
was copied from the North Carolina General Assembly’s website.  See North Carolina State 
Constitution, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Legislation/constitution/ 
ncconstitution_whole.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).  The text of the U.S. Constitution with its 
twenty-seven amendments was copied from the National Archives and Records Administration 
website.  See Bill of Rights, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/ 
exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2010); Constitution of the 
United States, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/ 
charters/constitution_transcript.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2010); Constitution of the United States: 
Amendments 11–27, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/ 
constitution_amendments_11-27.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).  To ensure a more accurate word 
count, the preamble to the Bill of Rights and notes on ratification dates and sections affected were 
deleted from the website text of the amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  Similarly, parenthetical 
references to session laws were deleted from the North Carolina Constitution.  The word count for 
the U.S. Constitution includes the attestation and names of the delegates, as well as a note on 
interlineations—these items are all found in the handwritten original document.  See High-
Resolution Downloads, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/ 
charters/charters_downloads.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2010). 
 31. Corum v. Univ. of N.C. ex rel. Bd. of Governors, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (N.C. 1992); see also 
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489, 491 (1977) (“State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections 
often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”).  
Some argue, however, that the detailed nature of state constitutions prevents reasoned state 
constitutional adjudication. 
Critics note that, in contrast to the concise clauses and general principles of the Federal 
Constitution, state constitutions are often excessively lengthy and filled with excruciating 
detail.  The critics contend that these characteristics of state constitutions render 
reasoned, principled interpretation of the documents very difficult.  Furthermore, the 
objection runs, the haphazard organization and multifarious content of state constitutions 
demonstrate the influence of special interests rather than the fundamental values of the 
state’s citizens.  Finally, these critics argue, the ease and frequency with which state 
constitutions are amended further inhibit state courts from discerning any principles of 
lasting significance from the documents. 
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Since state constitutions “arguably embod[y] the aims and 
aspirations of the state[s’] citizenry,”32—aims and aspirations which may 
shift more quickly than those of the entire country—the greater length of 
the constitutional text and the higher frequency of amendments are not 
surprising.  Discussing the language of the North Carolina Constitution, a 
former chief justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted “[t]he 
language is richer, more detailed, and more specific.”33  He went on to 
characterize its detail: “How much more fertile the ground in these richly 
detailed grants of individual liberties than in the mere prohibitions 
against abridgement of them found in the federal document.”34 
This combination of greater detail and increased responsiveness in 
North Carolina’s constitution provides a potentially “fertile ground” for 
litigants to plant their claims.  The frequency with which litigants have 
done so is the subject of the next section. 
B. Recent Trends in Reliance on the North Carolina Constitution 
Commentators look to Justice Brennan’s 1977 Harvard Law Review 
article35 as both noting and encouraging a reawakening in state 
constitutional adjudication across the country.36  State constitutional 
                                                                                                                       
James D. Heiple & Kraig James Powell, Presumed Innocent: The Legitimacy of Independent State 
Constitutional Interpretation, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1507, 1514–15 (1998) (footnotes omitted) (citing 
James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 818–20 
(1992); James A. Gardner, Reply, What Is a State Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1027 
(1993); Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 
459, 470–71 (1996)).  For further discussion of the detail found in the North Carolina Constitution, 
see infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 32. TARR, supra note 24, at 3; see also Heiple & Powell, supra note 31, at 1511 (“[A] state 
court’s decision applies only within a single state, and because it is based on that state’s laws and 
judicial precedents, is more likely to comport with the views of the citizens it affects.”). 
 33. James G. Exum, Jr., Dusting Off Our State Constitution, N.C. ST. B. Q., Spring 1986, at 6, 
6. 
 34. Id. at 6. 
 35. Brennan, supra note 31. 
 36. See, e.g., Ruth V. McGregor, Tribute, Recent Developments in Arizona State Constitutional 
Law, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 265, 265 (2003) (“Although state courts had previously looked to their own 
constitutions to resolve questions of individual rights, Justice Brennan’s article awakened increased 
interest in state constitutions as independent sources of such rights.”); Randall T. Shepard, The 
Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 421, 424 (1996) 
(“One need not search very far to find that scholarly literature regularly credits Justice Brennan with 
launching the renewal of state constitutional law. . . . [But m]ore important to the world of day-by-
day litigation, state courts exercised their constitutional authority in a variety of settings well before 
Justice Brennan’s exhortation.”).  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, “the interest in state supreme 
courts and state constitutional law experienced a remarkable reawakening.”  Acker & Walsh, supra 
note 21, at 1313.  “The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the state courts’ authority to 
recognize individual liberties under the aegis of state constitutional interpretation.  These liberties 
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adjudication has arguably existed for the entirety of each state’s history,37 
although the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments certainly deemphasized the role of states in the protection 
of individual rights.  In the elegant summary of one author: 
 Despite the strong assertion of national power evident in Justice 
Story’s opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the state courts retained 
their sovereign position as primary guarantors of the people’s civil 
liberties.  After all, the federal Constitution, with its narrowly defined 
scope, did not address the rights of state citizens, but only federal 
citizens.  So it worked, unquestioned in practice if not in theory, until 
the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War.  This time period, 
often referred to as the “vast transformation,” saw a tremendous 
metamorphosis in both the conception and role of the federal 
Constitution as a vehicle for protecting people from state actions that 
denied them liberties.  Indeed, the effect of the passage of the Civil War 
amendments was not lost on those in Congress who lobbied for their 
passage.  Cognizant of the sweeping changes in our federal system that 
the amendments would likely bring about, the drafters and supporters 
of the amendments forged ahead nonetheless because of the belief that 
the states had, in many cases, abdicated their responsibilities and 
duties.38 
While not discounting the importance of the historical state constitutional 
adjudications both before and after the Reconstruction amendments, this 
Article’s focus is within the “renaissance” period beginning in the 
1970s.39 
                                                                                                                       
may extend beyond the umbrella of federal constitutional protections.  State courts have extended 
them in approximately four hundred cases since 1970 . . . .”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 37. See, e.g., Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 6–7 (1787); see also Paul H. Anderson & 
Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s Approach to 
Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. 
REV. 865, 877–78 (2007) (“There is some dispute about whether this ‘new judicial federalism’ is 
really all that new.  Some scholars suggest that state constitutions always offered greater protection 
for individual rights.  But other scholars contend that our modern concept of individual rights 
originated in Supreme Court interpretations of the Federal Constitution and, thus, required federal 
individual rights interpretation before the states could develop their own individual rights 
jurisprudence.” (footnote omitted)). 
 38. Jennifer DiGiovanni, Justice Charles M. Leibson and the Revival of State Constitutional 
Law: A Microcosm of a Movement, 86 KY. L.J. 1009, 1012–13 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
 39. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 37, at 877 (“A renaissance of judicial federalism began 
in the 1970s.  Some commentators have indicated that this renaissance started as the result of a 
perceived retrenchment by the United States Supreme Court on individual rights during the Warren 
E. Burger era (1969–86), which followed the more progressive Earl Warren era (1953–69).  During 
this period of retrenchment, some state courts looked to their own constitutions to either maintain or 
provide greater protection for individual rights.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Although an exhaustive survey of North Carolina state constitutional 
adjudications is beyond the scope of this Article, a cursory search of 
legal databases reveals a trend of increased reliance.  The year 1970 was 
chosen as the starting date for the search, as it marks the beginning of a 
decade and is close in time to 1971, the year when the current 
constitution took effect.40  The data shown in Figure 1 below was 
gathered by conducting searches on both Westlaw and LEXIS for 
citations to the North Carolina Constitution in opinions issued by the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina.41 
 
Figure 1: North Carolina State "Constitutional" 




















 As Figure 1 shows, citations to the North Carolina Constitution have 
increased since the 1970s.  Not all of these cases necessarily involve 
lengthy state constitutional adjudications.  For example, approximately 
                                                     
 40. Sanders, supra note 11, at 144. 
 41. The search method was perfected through trial and error.  Initially disparate results between 
LEXIS and Westlaw were resolved by restricting the search to the text of the opinion itself and 
including “N.C.Const” (without a space) in both searches.  The final search language used on 
October 12, 2010 was: (1) Westlaw: da(after 12/31/1969) & co(high) & op(“n.c. const.” 
“n.c.const.”); (2) LEXIS: COURT(Supreme) and OPINION(“N.C. Const.” or “N.C.Const.”) and a 
date between 1/1/1970 and 10/12/2010.  The results were then restricted to the relevant decades to 
calculate the number of cases shown in Figure 1. 
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ten percent of the citations to the North Carolina Constitution are made 
in the same sentence as citations to the U.S. Constitution, usually in the 
resolution of a criminal appeal.42  The following citation is representative 
of these types of cases: “The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also 
N.C. Const. art. I, §§ 18, 19, 23.”43  Nonetheless, the fact that the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina is more frequently citing the North 
Carolina Constitution for support—whether independently or as part of 
an in-depth state constitutional adjudication—indicates an increased 
awareness of the potential value of the state constitution. 
 In his 1977 article encouraging reliance on state constitutional 
provisions, Justice Brennan wrote that it was “not easy to pinpoint why 
state courts [were] . . . beginning to emphasize the protections of their 
states’ own bills of rights.”44  He then went on to suggest that the reliance 
on state constitutions was a reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to further extend constitutional protections of individual 
rights.45 
 As a practical and procedural matter, the frequency of state 
constitutional adjudications ultimately rests with the bar.  If a plaintiff’s 
attorney does not include state constitutional claims in a complaint, they 
are extremely unlikely to materialize at trial or on appeal.  If an appellate 
defender arguing error in a criminal trial does not elaborate state 
constitutional grounds for the appeal, they may be waived and are not 
likely to be considered by the courts.  In the words of former Chief 
Justice Exum of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, “[o]ne of the 
tasks of advocacy is to raise the level of consciousness of those the 
advocate is trying to persuade. . . . So it is with state constitutional law.  
The level of the court’s consciousness about it can be raised.  Lawyers 
                                                     
 42. A search within the Westlaw results for “U.S. Const.” within the same sentence as “N.C. 
Const.” indicates that 30 of the 309 total cases include such “parallel constitutional” citations.  A 
similar search in LEXIS revealed that 27 of the 270 total cases include parallel constitutional 
citations.  While some of these cases with parallel constitutional citations may engage in 
comprehensive analysis of the North Carolina Constitution, the result is suggestive.  This result also 
comports with the general observations made during a brief read through a random selection of these 
cases. 
 43. State v. Wiley, 565 S.E.2d 22, 32 (N.C. 2002); see also State v. Canady, 559 S.E.2d 762, 
768 (N.C. 2002) (“A defendant in a criminal proceeding has the constitutional right to confront his 
accusers and the witnesses against him.  U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.C. Const. art. I, §§ 19, 23 
(2000).”). 
 44. Brennan, supra note 31, at 495. 
 45. See id. at 494–95. 
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are the ones to raise it.”46  In his 1977 article, Justice Brennan also 
“suggest[ed] to the bar that, although in the past it might have been safe 
for counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, 
plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state 
constitutional questions.”47  The words of these justices ring true today.  
While state constitutional claims end in the courts, they begin with the 
practicing bar. 
C. Models of State Constitutional Adjudication and North Carolina’s 
Approach 
 Once state constitutional matters arrive in the courts, the method of 
analysis applied by the courts becomes the most pertinent issue.  The 
generally accepted schema for constitutional decisions of state appellate 
courts consists of four interrelated models—primacy, interstitial, dual 
sovereignty, and lockstep—that characterize a state’s interpretation of its 
constitution relative to federal interpretations of identical or analogous 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution.48  The primacy model recognizes the 
                                                     
 46. Exum, supra note 33, at 9; see also State v. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d 479, 485 (N.C. 2005) 
(“Although this Court has previously reserved the right to grant Section 19 relief against 
unreasonable and arbitrary state statutes in circumstances where relief might not be obtainable under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we note that defendant does not seek 
independent relief under the Law of the Land Clause.” (emphasis added) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Acker & Walsh, supra note 21, at 1311 (“State courts’ reliance upon 
state law to resolve issues that also present federal questions is, in one sense, neither new nor 
innovative.  It is a stratagem, however, that was all but forgotten by one generation of lawyers, and 
not learned by another, in the midst of the Warren Court’s nationalization of Federal Bill of Rights 
protections during the 1960s.” (emphasis added)). 
 47. Brennan, supra note 31, at 502; see also McGregor, supra note 36, at 279 (“If Arizona is to 
continue its progress toward developing a coherent approach to state constitutional law and find a 
way to apply that approach consistently, regardless of which state constitutional provision is at issue, 
the courts require the assistance of lawyers.” (emphasis added)).  Then-Vice Chief Justice 
McGregor goes on to quote then-Judge Souter’s special concurrence in State v. Bradberry: 
It is the need of every appellate court for the participation of the bar in the process of 
trying to think sensibly and comprehensively about the questions that the judicial power 
has been established to answer.  Nowhere is the need greater than in the field of State 
constitutional law, where we are asked so often to confront questions that have already 
been decided under the National Constitution.  If we place too much reliance on federal 
precedent we will render the State rules a mere row of shadows; if we place too little, we 
will render State practice incoherent.  If we are going to steer between these extremes, we 
will have to insist on developed advocacy from those who bring the cases before us. 
Id. at 279–80 (quoting State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring 
specially)). 
 48. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 24, at 180–85 (discussing the “lockstep,” “primacy,” and 
“interstitial” approaches); Acker & Walsh, supra note 21, at 1315–19 (characterizing the models as 
“lockstep” or “equivalence,” “primacy,” “interstitial” or “supplemental,” and “dual sovereignty”); 
Anderson & Oseid, supra note 37, at 878–86 (describing and critiquing the four approaches); James 
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state constitution as a fundamental source of rights and accordingly 
begins analysis with provisions from the state constitution.49  The 
interstitial model views U.S. constitutional rights as minimal and seeks 
supplementation from the interstices when the federal right does not 
resolve the claim or where the state constitution has more expansive 
language.50  Under the dual-sovereignty model, both constitutions are 
analyzed more or less simultaneously.51  The lockstep model construes 
state constitutional provisions identically with analogous provisions in 
the U.S. Constitution.52 
 The approach of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is best 
characterized as lockstep, with some notable exceptions, two of which 
are the subject of this Article.  As an example, in the realm of due 
process, the North Carolina Constitution’s law of the land clause 
provides: “No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his 
freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner 
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”53  
Despite textual difference between the state and U.S. constitutions, the 
courts of North Carolina have repeatedly held that “‘law of the land’ as 
used in Article I, Section 19, of the Constitution of North Carolina, is 
synonymous with ‘due process of law’ as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”54  Nevertheless, North Carolina reserves the right to 
                                                                                                                       
A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional 
Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1054–58 (2003) (discussing the “primacy” and 
“interstitial” models as the two main viewpoints and criticizing them for being “unhelpfully rigid” 
and for failing to take account of the complexity of interaction between states and the federal 
government); Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 
1004 (1996) (briefly describing the four approaches); Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State 
Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of 
Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1017, 1032–50 (1994) (examining the four 
approaches in the context of free exercise claims). 
 49. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 24, at 183–85; Holland, supra note 48, at 1004.  For a defense 
of the primacy approach, see generally Heiple & Powell, supra note 31. 
 50. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 24, at 182–83; Holland, supra note 48, at 1004. 
 51. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 48, at 1004. 
 52. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 24, at 180–81; Holland, supra note 48, at 1004.  The lockstep 
model can be a result of explicit constitutional provisions, express judicial adoption, or implicit 
judicial adoption.  See Acker & Walsh, supra note 21, at 1316; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 
(“This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.”). 
 53. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. 
 54. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (N.C. 2004); see also Tri-Cnty. Paving, Inc. v. 
Ashe Cnty., 281 F.3d 430, 435 n.6 (4th Cir. 2002) (“North Carolina courts have consistently 
interpreted the due process and equal protection clauses of the North Carolina Constitution as 
synonymous with their Fourteenth Amendment counterparts.”). 
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deviate from this lockstep analysis at any point.55  This has occurred at 
least once in the area of criminal procedure.56 
 The lockstep model—as implemented by courts in North Carolina 
and elsewhere—has, unsurprisingly, both critics and supporters.  Critics 
contend that lockstep analysis “submerges” state constitutional 
adjudication “utterly into federal jurisprudence.”57  Further, lockstep 
analysis “is inconsistent with the nation’s commitment to dual 
constitutionalism” because state courts have a duty to interpret their state 
constitution and “cannot legitimately delegate that responsibility to the 
Supreme Court by binding themselves to its rulings.”58  When state 
courts engage in such a binding lockstep analysis, they fail to provide the 
“‘double security’ for rights” that is part of our federal system.59 
 To the extent that these criticisms are directed at state courts that 
mechanically adopt federal interpretations, they seem appropriate.  But 
such criticisms do not necessarily apply to North Carolina’s lockstep 
approach, which considers federal authorities persuasive—not binding. 
                                                     
 55. See Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 206 S.E.2d 141, 146 (N.C. 
1974) (“[I]n the construction of the provision of the State Constitution, the meaning given by the 
Supreme Court of the United States to even an identical term in the Constitution of the United States 
is, though highly persuasive, not binding upon this Court.”); see also State v. Jackson, 503 S.E.2d 
101, 104 (N.C. 1998) (“In construing the North Carolina Constitution, this Court is not bound by the 
decisions of federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court.  However, we give the most 
serious consideration to those decisions, and in our discretion we may conclude that the reasoning of 
such decisions is persuasive.” (citation and internal quotations marks omitted)). 
 56. Compare State v. Welch, 342 S.E.2d 789, 795 (N.C. 1986) (“Therefore, on the basis of the 
Leon-Sheppard good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, we conclude that the trial court did not 
err on these facts by admitting evidence resulting from the taking of the sample of the defendant’s 
blood.”), and id. at 796 (Exum, J., concurring) (“I agree that under the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court relied on by the majority this Court must apply the ‘good faith’ exception to the 
exclusionary rule in determining admissibility of evidence unconstitutionally seized under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. . . . The parties have not argued 
whether this exception may sustain admissibility under the North Carolina Constitution.  My 
concurrence in the Court’s opinion is based on my understanding that the opinion neither addresses 
nor answers this question.”), with State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 554 (N.C. 1988) (“This case 
presents us with the question of whether there is a good faith exception under article I, section 20 of 
the North Carolina Constitution to the exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and 
seizure.  We hold that there is no good faith exception to the requirements of article I, section 20 as 
applied to the facts of this case . . . .”). 
 57. Randall T. Shepard, The Renaissance in State Constitutional Law: There Are a Few 
Dangers, but What’s the Alternative?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1529, 1550 (1998) (“One alternative, of 
course, is stalwart, lockstep adherence to the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitution.  I have 
already stated my distrust of this ‘solution’ to the problems of state constitutionalism and I continue 
to believe that for state courts to submerge utterly into federal jurisprudence is both unwise and 
invalid as a matter of history and legal analysis.” (footnote omitted)). 
 58. TARR, supra note 24, at 181. 
 59. Id. 
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 Supporters of lockstep analysis acknowledge this division between 
“binding lockstep” and “persuasive lockstep.”  While the ultimate 
determination of legal rights might be the same in many cases, 
persuasive lockstep analysis leaves the door open for a state court to 
diverge from federal jurisprudence.  One supporter of lockstep analysis 
expresses the notion of persuasive lockstep as follows: 
Lockstep analysis, one might say, does not necessarily reveal an 
abandonment by state courts of their responsibilities to protect liberty 
and to reflect meaningfully upon the best ways to do so.  On the 
contrary, it might well represent a discharge of those responsibilities, 
but in circumstances where the state court feels that the national 
government is already doing a reasonably good job.  In those 
circumstances, a state court might reasonably conclude that there is no 
need, at least for the moment, to explore in any greater depth the 
possibilities presented by the state constitution to protect liberty any 
more or less vigorously than it is already protected by the national 
judicial analysis.  Lockstep analysis thus need not represent an absence 
of independent constitutional judgment; it can just as easily represent 
the outcome of a fully-informed exercise of independent state judicial 
judgment.60 
Jeffrey Usman helpfully catalogs the arguments made by supporters of 
lockstep analysis: 
Advocates of state court adherence to federal precedent (1) question 
whether states are really distinct political communities with divergent 
identities, (2) assert the importance of national values to constitutional 
interpretation, (3) note that many state provisions are modeled on the 
Federal Constitution, (4) suggest reliance preserves judicial resources 
by allowing state courts to tap into a huge volume of decisions 
addressing the requirements of the Federal Constitution, (5) caution 
that reliance avoids varying mandates that could be confusing for state 
officials, and (6) claim that reliance fosters judicial restraint.61 
 Critics of lockstep analysis arguably acknowledge the legitimacy of 
persuasive lockstep analysis, as exemplified by Professor Tarr: 
In undertaking this independent inquiry, a state court may of course 
consult how the Supreme Court has interpreted analogous federal 
                                                     
 60. Gardner, supra note 48, at 1061. 
 61. Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive 
Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1493–94 (2010). 
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provisions, just as it may consult how other state courts have 
interpreted their counterpart guarantees.  But if a state court decides to 
conform its interpretation of a state provision to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of an analogous federal provision, this decision has to be 
based on the persuasiveness of the Court’s argument rather than on the 
Court’s position in the legal hierarchy.62 
 Setting aside a more thorough examination of the drawbacks and 
benefits of persuasive lockstep, the fact remains that the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina has typically followed this form of analysis.63  The 
opinions in which North Carolina’s highest court has followed U.S. 
Supreme Court rulings—while they may include rationales that diverge 
slightly from the federal rationale for the rule—do not provide much 
opportunity for analyzing North Carolina’s unique place among the 
courts of this country.  But the Supreme Court of North Carolina has 
stepped “out of lockstep” in several cases to address an exclusively state 
constitutional matter or interpret a state constitutional provision 
differently.64  In two of these cases, the court has adopted intermediate 
scrutiny as a resolution to the constitutional conflict.65 
III. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN NORTH CAROLINA 
A. Intermediate Scrutiny in Federal and Other State Courts 
 As typically phrased by the U.S. Supreme Court, the intermediate 
scrutiny test asks whether a statutory classification is “substantially 
related to an important governmental objective.”66  If not, the 
classification is unconstitutional.67  While the test for intermediate 
scrutiny is easy to state, its application in various cases has not led to the 
development of a crisp, bright-line rule.  Rather, the application of 
intermediate scrutiny has varied between cases, as have applications of 
strict scrutiny and rational basis review.  As legal scholars have 
                                                     
 62. TARR, supra note 24, at 182. 
 63. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
 64. For those cases where there is no analogous federal precedent, some would argue the 
departure from lockstep analysis is unavoidable.  See Usman, supra note 61, at 1494 (“The 
interpretation of positive constitutional rights in state constitutions is a significantly different 
enterprise than interpreting negative rights under state constitutions if for no other reason than state 
courts do not have the smothering security blanket of federal precedent on which to hold tightly.”). 
 65. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 66. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 67. See id. 
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repeatedly noted, “the degree of judicial skepticism or deference varies 
considerably within levels of scrutiny.”68  Speaking generally, the most 
that can be said with certainty is that intermediate scrutiny simply falls 
somewhere “in between” rational basis review and strict scrutiny.69 
 The flexibility in the intensity of review under intermediate scrutiny 
has made it a useful tool within the federal court system.  In addition to 
its well-known use for classifications based on gender and legitimacy,70 
intermediate scrutiny has been applied to in-between claims where 
underlying constitutional rights are qualified in some fashion.  A good 
example of such an application of intermediate scrutiny can be seen in 
the Fourth Circuit’s determination of the appropriate standard for a 
challenge to a curfew for minors: 
 Initially we must consider the level of scrutiny appropriate to this 
case.  Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance infringes minors’ 
constitutional liberties and therefore should be subject to strict scrutiny.  
It is true that a child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond 
the protection of the Constitution.  Minors enjoy some rights under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments before they attain adulthood.  At the 
same time, the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that 
children’s rights are not coextensive with those of adults.  Traditionally 
at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some of the 
most fundamental rights of self-determination—including even the 
right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will. 
 In recognition of these customary limitations, the state’s authority 
over children’s activities is broader than over like actions of adults.  
                                                     
 68. E.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, The Sex Discount, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1169 & n.148 
(2010) (comparing U.S. Supreme Court opinions with differing applications of strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review); see also Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and 
Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1727 (2005) (“Not only has strict scrutiny 
become less than strict in Grutter, but the rational basis test has become stricter to protect groups 
like the mentally retarded, the children of illegal immigrants, and homosexuals.  The Court 
introduced a medium level of scrutiny in its sex equality cases in the 1970s, and then began applying 
it in novel ways in the First Amendment area in the 1990s.” (footnotes omitted)); Trina Jones, 
Response, Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 437 (2010) (“At times the Court 
has applied a more robust version of rational basis review, and at times it has applied a more robust 
version of intermediate scrutiny.  Moreover, strict scrutiny has produced different outcomes in 
comparable cases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 69. See, e.g., H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[I]ntermediate 
scrutiny requires less of a showing than does ‘the most exacting’ strict scrutiny standard of 
review.”). 
 70. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (“Between these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny 
lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory 
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”). 
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State laws do not permit children to drive a car before they reach a 
certain age.  Compulsory attendance laws require children to attend 
school.  Labor laws limit the opportunities of children to engage in 
gainful employment.  These types of laws reflect the state’s general 
interest in youth’s well being. 
 In light of the case law, two things seem clear.  First, children do 
possess at least qualified rights, so an ordinance which restricts their 
liberty to the extent that this one does should be subject to more than 
rational basis review.  Second, because children do not possess the 
same rights as adults, the ordinance should be subject to less than the 
strictest level of scrutiny.  We thus believe intermediate scrutiny to be 
the most appropriate level of review and must determine whether the 
ordinance is substantially related to important governmental interests.71 
 Like their federal counterparts, state courts have applied intermediate 
scrutiny to the familiar categories of gender and legitimacy.72  In 
addition, state courts have applied intermediate scrutiny to challenges 
based on state constitutional rights that have been qualified in some 
fashion.73  State courts have sometimes modified the phrasing of the 
intermediate scrutiny standard.  For example, in the context of an 
involuntary civil commitment proceeding, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire observed: “In considering an equal protection challenge 
under our State Constitution, . . . [c]lassifications involving important 
substantive rights must be reasonable and rest upon some ground of 
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
                                                     
 71. Schleifer ex rel. Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 846–47 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(emphases added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72. See, e.g., People v. Botruff, 817 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill. 2004) (“Intermediate scrutiny applies 
to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”); Salaiscooper v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 
Court ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 34 P.3d 509, 517 (Nev. 2001) (indicating intermediate scrutiny applies 
to a claim of gender discrimination pursued under the Nevada and United States constitutions); 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d 203, 207 (N.C. 2001) (recognizing U.S. Supreme Court cases 
that held that “[o]ther classifications, including gender and illegitimacy, trigger intermediate 
scrutiny.”); State v. Thompson, 95 Ohio St. 3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124, 767 N.E.2d 251, at ¶ 13 
(“When a discriminatory classification based on sex or illegitimacy is at issue, we employ 
heightened or intermediate scrutiny and require that the classification be substantially related to an 
important governmental objective.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Soloco, Inc. v. Dupree, 97-1256, p. 4 (La. 1/21/98); 707 So. 2d 12, 15 (“[Under 
the Louisiana Constitution, a]n intermediate level of scrutiny is reserved for laws which classify 
persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliation.”); 
Davis v. Union Pac. R.R., 937 P.2d 27, 31 (Mont. 1997) (Regnier, J., plurality opinion) (“Middle-tier 
scrutiny has been used in limited situations, including those where the rights at issue have some 
origin in the Montana Constitution, such as welfare, but are not found in the Declaration of 
Rights.”). 
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legislation.”74  The court went on to note that it had “applied this 
‘intermediate review’ to a broader category of rights than do the federal 
courts, although [its] analysis when applying this level of review is the 
same.”75  In other words, it seems New Hampshire has applied 
intermediate scrutiny to more rights and—even though phrased 
differently—it applies the federal test. 
 State courts, in interpreting state constitutional provisions, are free to 
diverge from the methods of constitutional analysis applied by the 
federal courts.76  When conducting state constitutional analysis, state 
courts generally encounter two types of claims: (1) those where there is a 
parallel provision in the U.S. Constitution and (2) those where the state 
constitution is the only basis for the claim.  In the first category, federal 
interpretations of the U.S. Constitution provide a floor for a variety of 
rights,77 although states are free to interpret their state constitutions to 
provide more protections to those rights than the U.S. Constitution 
does.78  In the second category, states are generally free from federal 
jurisprudential constraints.79 
                                                     
 74. In re Sandra H., 846 A.2d 513, 517 (N.H. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Exum, supra note 33, at 8 (“Under its own state constitution, a state court is not bound 
by constructs of constitutional doctrines used by the United States Supreme Court.”). 
 77. See State v. Jackson, 503 S.E.2d 101, 103 (N.C. 1998) (“[B]ecause the United States 
Constitution is binding on the states, the rights it guarantees must be applied to every citizen by the 
courts of North Carolina, so no citizen will be ‘accorded lesser rights’ no matter how we construe the 
state Constitution. . . . [T]he United States Constitution provides a constitutional floor of 
fundamental rights guaranteed all citizens of the United States, while the state constitutions 
frequently give citizens of individual states basic rights in addition to those guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution.”).  At least two scholars have noted the impreciseness of the “federal floor” 
metaphor in the area of criminal procedure.  See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: 
State Law Below Federal Constitutional Limits, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2008) (“In the area 
of criminal procedure there are myriad state court decisions, statutes, rules, and practices that are 
sometimes more restrictive and sometimes more generous with respect to civil liberties and 
government authority than their federal counterparts.  Surveying the full range of topics within the 
field of criminal procedure it is common to find state positions both above and below the federal 
constitutional ‘floor.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 78. See Brennan, supra note 31, at 502 & n.83 (noting that the Supreme Court has made clear 
numerous times that its “decisions . . . are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding 
rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law”); see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 
719 (1975) (“[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police 
activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.”); Cooper 
v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (“Our holding, of course, does not affect the State’s power to 
impose higher standards . . . than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.”). 
 79. See Jackson, 503 S.E.2d at 103–04 (“States remain free to interpret their own constitutions 
in any way they see fit, including constructions which grant a citizen rights where none exist under 
the federal Constitution.” (citing Lowe v. Tarble, 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (N.C. 1985))). 
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 Blankenship and King involved interpretations of the North Carolina 
Constitution to provide greater rights than are found under the U.S. 
Constitution.  Representing the first category of state constitutional 
adjudications, Blankenship interpreted the state equal protection clause to 
find greater rights for voters than exist under the federal counterpart.80  
King, on the other hand, addressed an exclusively state constitutional 
matter—the extent of the state constitutional right to education for long-
term suspended students.81  Both cases involved the application of state 
constitutional intermediate scrutiny. 
B. Blankenship v. Bartlett 
 The legislative redistricting that occurs soon after each national 
census frequently leads to challenges in state and federal courts.82  North 
Carolina is no exception.  The challenges to legislative redistricting 
brought in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s were all filed in or successfully 
removed to federal court.83  But the challenge to the 2000 redistricting 
was resolved by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Stephenson v. 
Bartlett.84  The challenge involved “a state law question of first 
impression”—whether the state legislature had violated the whole-county 
provisions85 of the state constitution when it enacted the 2001 legislative 
redistricting plans.86 
 The plaintiffs, who were North Carolina registered voters, argued 
that the whole-county provisions prevented the General Assembly from 
dividing counties in creating legislative districts, “except to the extent 
necessary to comply with federal law.”87  The defendants—the board of 
                                                     
 80. See infra Part III.B. 
 81. See infra Part III.C. 
 82. See Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1719 (1999) (“After 
the 1980 census, ‘roughly one-third of all redistricting was done either directly by federal courts or 
under the injunctive authority of the courts,’ and the post-1990 round saw at least forty-one states in 
court over at least one of their apportionments.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Samuel Issacharoff, 
Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 
1689–90 (1993))). 
 83. See Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev’d, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); 
Cavanagh v. Brock, 577 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D.N.C. 1983); Drum v. Seawell, 249 F. Supp. 877, 
879 (M.D.N.C. 1965). 
 84. Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson I), 562 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 2002). 
 85. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 3(3) (“No county shall be divided in the formation of a senate 
district . . . .”); id. § 5(3) (“No county shall be divided in the formation of a representative 
district . . . .”). 
 86. Stephenson I, 562 S.E.2d at 381, 383. 
 87. Id. at 381. 
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elections and various political leaders88—attempted to remove the case to 
federal court.89  But the federal court remanded, noting that the plaintiffs 
had challenged the redistricting solely on state constitutional grounds.90 
 The Supreme Court of North Carolina found that “[t]he 2001 
legislative redistricting plans violate[d] the [whole-county provisions] for 
reasons unrelated to compliance with federal law.”91  Specifically, the 
court noted that 51 of 100 counties were divided by the senate 
redistricting plan and 70 of 100 counties were divided by the house 
redistricting plan.92  The court ultimately held that because the General 
Assembly’s 2001 legislative redistricting plans divided counties without 
a federal law justification, the plans were unconstitutional and void.93 
 As part of Stephenson I, the court considered proposed remedial 
plans submitted by the plaintiffs.  Notably, the court found that these 
remedial plans “implicate[d] the fundamental right to vote on equal 
terms, and thus strict scrutiny [was] the applicable standard.”94 
 On remand, the trial court found that the revised redistricting plans 
drawn up after the Stephenson I decision were unconstitutional.95  The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, reiterating that the whole-
county provisions required the General Assembly to avoid dividing 
counties, except “to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, 
including the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle and the [Voting Rights 
Act of 1965].”96 
 The landmark Stephenson decisions—and the application of state 
constitutional provisions in that litigation—likely paved the way for the 
challenge to judicial districts in Blankenship v. Bartlett. 
 The plaintiffs in Blankenship challenged Wake County judicial 
districts that disproportionately distributed voting power in the elections 
for resident superior court judges.97  The General Assembly created the 
potential imbalance in voter strength in a 1993 statutory amendment that 
added a judgeship to District 10A.98  As Table 1 shows, the challenged 
                                                     
 88. See id. at 377. 
 89. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 180 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D.N.C. 2001). 
 90. See id. at 786. 
 91. Stephenson I, 562 S.E.2d at 389. 
 92. Id. at 390. 
 93. See id. at 392. 
 94. See id. at 393. 
 95. Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson II), 582 S.E.2d 247, 249 (N.C. 2003). 
 96. Id. at 251, 254. 
 97. See Blankenship v. Bartlett, 681 S.E.2d 759, 761–62 (N.C. 2009). 
 98. See id. at 761. 
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judicial districts granted residents in District 10A approximately four to 
five times more voting power than residents in the other three districts.99 
 












10A 64,398 2 32,199 
10B 281,493 2 140,747 
10C 158,812 1 158,812 
10D 123,143 1 123,143 
 
 The Supreme Court of North Carolina found that the North Carolina 
Constitution’s equal protection clause applied to the General Assembly’s 
creation of the District 10A judgeship.101  At the outset, the court noted 
that it usually follows the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in equal 
protection matters, but that such analysis was not binding on the court.102  
Acknowledging that federal courts had found “the ‘one-person, one-vote’ 
standard . . . inapplicable to state judicial elections,” the court observed 
“considerable tension in the jurisprudence, as clearly illustrated by 
Chisom v. Roemer.”103  Reviewing Chisom and other U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions, the court concluded that “the [U.S.] Supreme Court has 
indicated both that judges are representatives and that they do not 
represent people.”104  This “seeming contradiction” and “fundamental 
tension” was central to the North Carolina Supreme Court’s explanation 
of its holding: “Rather than wholly ignoring that tension, this Court 
acknowledges it by holding that our State’s Equal Protection Clause 
requires a heightened level of scrutiny of judicial election districts.”105 
 The court also looked to federal equal protection jurisprudence 
addressing semi-suspect classes and quasi-fundamental rights.106  In light 
of this federal jurisprudence, the court continued its review of the North 
                                                     
 99. See id. 
 100. This table is copied from the Blankenship opinion.  See id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 762. 
 103. Id. at 763 (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 764–65. 
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Carolina Constitution and found that part of the article on the judiciary 
guaranteed “an individual right of the people to vote in [judicial] 
elections.”107  Reading this section with the equal protection provision, 
and in light of the representative aspects of state judicial office, the court 
held “that the right to vote in superior court elections on substantially 
equal terms is a quasi-fundamental right which is subject to a heightened 
level of scrutiny.”108 
 The state equal protection analysis and the quasi-fundamental right 
to vote under the state constitution provided the court with two 
frameworks to determine the applicable level of scrutiny.109  Both 
analyses indicated that some form of heightened scrutiny—but not strict 
scrutiny—should apply.110 
 In determining the form of “heightened scrutiny” applicable under 
the state equal protection clause, the court found “many important policy 
interests to be weighed in addition to population” and held that “strict 
scrutiny according to the one-person, one-vote rule is inappropriate 
here.”111  The court provided a non-exhaustive list of policy interests that 
the legislature might consider in drawing judicial districts, including 
“geography, population density, convenience, number of citizens in the 
district eligible to be judges, and number and types of legal proceedings 
in a given area.”112  With these legislative policy interests militating 
against strict scrutiny, the court found that the applicable scrutiny was 
“somewhere in between,” as the following discourse indicates: 
 We conclude that judicial elections have a component that 
implicates the fundamental right to vote and a separate component that 
is ordinarily the province of the legislature, subject only to review for 
rationality by the courts.  The right to vote on equal terms for 
representatives triggers heightened scrutiny, even as the 
nonrepresentative aspects inherent in the role of the judiciary preclude 
strict scrutiny on a one-person, one-vote standard.  Thus, neither 
rational basis nor strict scrutiny is an appropriate standard of review.   
                                                     
 107. Id. at 765 (citing N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 764 (“Federal equal protection analysis provides us with another framework under 
which plaintiffs’ claims should be decided.” (emphasis added)). 
 110. See id. at 763, 765. 
 111. Id. at 763. 
 112. Id. at 766. 
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Rather, we conclude the applicable standard lies somewhere in 
between.113 
 The court analogized the appropriate level of scrutiny of state 
judicial elections to the scrutiny of symbolic speech, which “combine[s] 
speech and non-speech elements in the same course of conduct.”114  
Because state judicial elections “combine representative and 
nonrepresentative aspects,” intermediate scrutiny was the correct 
standard.115  Specifically, the court held that “[j]udicial districts will be 
sustained if the legislature’s formulations advance important 
governmental interests unrelated to vote dilution and do not weaken 
voter strength substantially more than necessary to further those 
interests.”116 
 Blankenship is notable in its application of intermediate scrutiny to 
resolve potentially conflicting state constitutional provisions.  
Intermediate scrutiny serves as an elegant solution to the “fundamental 
tension” between judges as representatives and nonrepresentatives.  In 
addition, Blankenship is part of a small class of cases where the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina has found more protection under the North 
Carolina Constitution than exists under the U.S. Constitution.  In other 
words, Blankenship represents the state supreme court engaging in 
interstitial, or supplemental, analysis rather than falling into lockstep 
with federal precedent.  These notable features of Blankenship are even 
more evident in King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort County Board of 
Education, the subject of the next section. 
C. King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort County Board of Education 
 Similar to other states, North Carolina’s constitution includes several 
provisions directly addressing education.117  A portion of the Declaration 
of Rights states that “[t]he people have a right to the privilege of 
education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that 
right.”118  In addition, the North Carolina Constitution devotes the 
                                                     
 113. Id. at 763–64 (citation omitted). 
 114. Id. at 765. 
 115. Id. at 765–66. 
 116. Id. at 766. 
 117. See Usman, supra note 61, at 1465 (“[E]very state constitution contains a clause expressly 
addressing education.”). 
 118. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
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entirety of article IX to education.119  Specifically, section 2 states that 
“[t]he General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a 
general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be 
maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal 
opportunities shall be provided for all students.”120 
 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,121 the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided that disparate educational funding did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and that education 
was not a fundamental right activating strict scrutiny.122  Following 
Rodriguez—and perhaps motivated by Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 
suggestion in dissent123—educational-rights litigation shifted to state 
constitutional challenges and, in some cases, campaigns to amend state 
constitutions.124  The landmark North Carolina decision from this line of 
cases is Leandro v. State.125 
 The challenge to state educational funding brought in Leandro 
involved a somewhat complex alignment of parties, including: (1) 
plaintiff students and local school boards from relatively poor rural 
districts, (2) plaintiff-intervenors from relatively large and wealthy city 
school systems, and (3) the state and state board of education as 
defendants.126  Collectively, the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the constitutional right to 
equal educational opportunities was being denied by defendants because 
of funding disparities.127  The rural plaintiffs pointed to poor facilities, 
inadequate educational resources, low teacher salaries, and low test 
                                                     
 119. See id. art. IX. 
 120. Id. § 2. 
 121. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 122. Id. at 37–38, 40, 56. 
 123. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Essay, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its 
Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1971 (2008) (noting Justice Thurgood Marshall’s suggestion in a 
footnote to his Rodriguez dissent that “‘nothing in the Court’s decision today . . . should inhibit 
further review of state educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions’” (quoting 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 133 n.100 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting))). 
 124. See Usman, supra note 61, at 1469 (“Following in the wake of [the Rodriguez] decision, 
school related litigation shifted to state constitutional provisions.  Litigation theories predominantly 
focused on funding disparities between districts and the adequacy of educational funding.  The 
underlying litigation strategy was coupled with pursuit of constitutional amendments addressing 
issues of school quality, funding, and safety.” (footnotes omitted)).  See generally Sutton, supra note 
123 (tracing the background of Rodriguez and reviewing its impact on state court adjudications of 
educational rights). 
 125. 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). 
 126. Id. at 252–53. 
 127. Id. 
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scores on state and national tests.128  The urban plaintiff-intervenors 
claimed a disproportionate financial burden because of relatively large 
numbers of special-education, limited-English-proficient, and 
academically gifted students and argued that the burden from these 
students forced them to divert funding from regular education services.129 
 Addressing these state constitutional challenges, the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina held there was a fundamental right to “an opportunity 
to receive a sound basic education” and that this right included a 
qualitative component.130  The court defined “sound basic education” in 
great detail: 
For purposes of our Constitution, a “sound basic education” is one that 
will provide the student with at least: (1) sufficient ability to read, 
write, and speak the English language and a sufficient knowledge of 
fundamental mathematics and physical science to enable the student to 
function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient 
fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic economic and 
political systems to enable the student to make informed choices with 
regard to issues that affect the student personally or affect the student’s 
community, state, and nation; (3) sufficient academic and vocational 
skills to enable the student to successfully engage in post-secondary 
education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic and 
vocational skills to enable the student to compete on an equal basis 
with others in further formal education or gainful employment in 
contemporary society.131 
After recognizing this state constitutional right, the court “conclude[d] 
that provisions of the current state system for funding schools which 
require or allow counties to help finance their school systems and result 
in unequal funding among the school districts of the state do not violate 
constitutional principles.”132 
 Leandro’s recognition of a fundamental right to education proved 
foundational in a series of cases addressing various aspects of North 
Carolina’s system for public education.133  The North Carolina 
                                                     
 128. Id. at 252. 
 129. Id. at 252–53. 
 130. See id. at 255, 261. 
 131. Id. at 255. 
 132. Id. at 256. 
 133. See King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 260–61 
(N.C. 2010); Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 681 S.E.2d 278, 284–
87 (N.C. 2009) (Newby, J., concurring); Wake Cares, Inc. v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 675 S.E.2d 
345, 350 (N.C. 2009); Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 396–97 (N.C. 2004). 
MARTIN FINAL 5/20/2011  3:35 PM 
2011] INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN NORTH CAROLINA 785 
experience can be contrasted with the federal experience under 
Rodriguez and the experience of states that have not recognized 
education as a fundamental right.  If education is not a fundamental right 
in a given legal landscape, rational basis review applies.134  
Consequently, the actions of the school board, state legislature, and other 
actors in educational governance are much more likely to be upheld on 
constitutional review.  But when a fundamental right is recognized, “state 
courts must confront the challenge . . . . In addressing such rights, the 
interpretive approaches adopted by state courts have reflected a rich 
diversity.  But it cannot be ignored that many state courts have struggled 
mightily with the task.”135  One such challenge—and perhaps mighty 
struggle—faced the Supreme Court of North Carolina in King. 
 The plaintiff in King challenged the school board’s denial of 
alternative-education services to her during her long-term suspension for 
fighting.136  A procedural due process hearing by a panel of central office 
administrators upheld the suspension, which King then challenged in 
superior court.137  Notably, neither the school board nor the school 
superintendent provided King with a reason for the denial of alternative-
education services.138 
 Before the Supreme Court of North Carolina, King argued that the 
school board’s “denial of alternative education during her long-term 
suspension [was] a violation of the state constitution.”139  Relying on her 
Leandro right to a sound basic education, King urged the court “to apply 
strict scrutiny to [the] defendants’ decision to deny her alternative 
education.”140 
 The court recognized that the intersection of school discipline and 
education “require[d it] to harmonize the rational basis test employed in 
school discipline cases with the strict scrutiny analysis that formed a part 
of [its] constitutional holding in school funding cases.”141  In other 
                                                     
 134. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (“A century of 
Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application 
of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State’s system be shown to bear 
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”); Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of 
Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1097 (Mass. 1995) (“In light of our conclusion that the plaintiff does 
not have a fundamental right to an education under Part II, c. 5, § 2, we apply the lowest level of 
scrutiny, the rational basis test, to her claim . . . .”). 
 135. Usman, supra note 61, at 1461. 
 136. King, 704 S.E.2d at 261. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 265. 
 139. Id. at 261. 
 140. Id. at 263. 
 141. Id. at 262. 
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words, the Leandro court’s recognition of education as a fundamental 
right created a constitutional conflict between discipline and education 
that the court had to resolve in King. 
 After reviewing the text of the state constitution and the statutory 
scheme for alternative education, the court held that there was no state 
constitutional right to alternative education, as alternative-education 
programs were statutory in origin.142  Notwithstanding the lack of a 
constitutional right to alternative education, the court held that a long-
term suspended student does have a state constitutional right to know the 
reasons for exclusion from alternative education because the denial of the 
statutory right could potentially infringe on the state constitutional right 
to equal educational access.143 
 Having recognized a state constitutional right to an explanation, the 
court then considered the appropriate standard of review.144  The court 
reviewed precedent from within and outside of North Carolina, noting 
the national trend towards rational basis review of school disciplinary 
matters, but also acknowledging its prior application of strict scrutiny in 
Leandro.145  On the one hand, the court viewed strict scrutiny as 
imposing “unworkable burdens . . . on school administrators, . . . 
jeopardiz[ing] the safety of the greater school community and imped[ing] 
the educational progress of the suspended student’s peers.”146  “Rational 
basis review, on the other hand, [did] not adequately protect student 
access to educational opportunities or guard against arbitrary decisions or 
inadvertent errors by school officials.”147  Having found strict scrutiny 
and rational basis review inappropriate, the court held that intermediate 
scrutiny was the applicable standard.148  According to the court, “school 
administrators must articulate an important or significant reason for 
denying students access to alternative education; however, the reasons 
supporting their decisions do not need to be compelling.”149 
 As in Blankenship,150 intermediate scrutiny proved a useful solution 
to the constitutional conflict presented in King.  Whether intermediate 
                                                     
 142. Id. at 261. 
 143. Id. at 261–62. 
 144. Id. at 262. 
 145. See id. at 262–63. 
 146. Id. at 264.  A concurring and dissenting opinion argued for the application of strict scrutiny.  
See id. at 266 (Timmons-Goodson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 147. Id. at 264 (majority opinion).  A dissenting opinion argued for the application of rational 
basis review.  See id. at 271 (Newby, J., dissenting). 
 148. Id. at 265 (majority opinion). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See supra Part III.B. 
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scrutiny is the best solution to the challenges brought in King and 
Blankenship is left for the reader to determine.  The next section attempts 
to inform such a determination by cataloging the benefits and drawbacks 
of intermediate scrutiny as a standard of review. 
D. Possible Drawbacks and Benefits 
 As demonstrated by the North Carolina Supreme Court’s experience 
in King and Blankenship, intermediate scrutiny has the benefit of 
flexibility.  Blankenship borrowed the intermediate scrutiny standard 
from federal law to resolve the conflict between judges as representatives 
and judges as neutral adjudicators.151  King then cited Blankenship for the 
state constitutional standard of intermediate scrutiny.152  But King firmly 
grounded the standard in state constitutional law and applied state-law 
nuances by articulating intermediate scrutiny with this language: “Under 
the state intermediate scrutiny standard, school administrators must 
articulate an important or significant reason for denying students access 
to alternative education; however, the reasons supporting their decisions 
do not need to be compelling.”153  King did not explicitly place the 
burden of persuasion on the state,154 as is sometimes specified with 
federal intermediate scrutiny.155  Both King and Blankenship made use of 
the flexibility of intermediate scrutiny in resolving the unique state 
constitutional claims brought before the court.  Such flexible applications 
of intermediate scrutiny have been made by other state courts, which 
sometimes phrase the standard in novel ways.156 
                                                     
 151. See Blankenship v. Bartlett, 681 S.E.2d 759, 764–65 (N.C. 2009). 
 152. See King, 704 S.E.2d at 265. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (noting, in a heightened 
application of intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination, that “[t]he burden of justification is 
demanding and it rests entirely on the State”), with Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461–65 (1988) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny but not indicating the burden is on the state to justify the statute). 
 156. See, e.g., State v. Stummer, 194 P.3d 1043, 1050 (Ariz. 2008) (“The appropriate test for 
measuring the constitutionality of content-based secondary effects regulations must vindicate the 
constitutional right to free speech, yet accommodate the government’s interest in protecting the 
public health, safety, and welfare.  The test has two phases.  First, to qualify for intermediate 
scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that a content-based regulation is directed at ameliorating 
secondary effects, not at suppressing protected speech.  Second, to survive intermediate scrutiny, the 
State must show that, in addressing the secondary effects, the regulation does not sweep too 
broadly.”); Davis v. Union Pac. R.R., 937 P.2d 27, 31–32 (Mont. 1997) (“Middle-tier scrutiny 
requires the state to demonstrate that its classification is reasonable and that its interest in the 
classification is greater than that of the individual’s interest in the right infringed.”).  The rational 
basis test can also be reworked in state constitutional adjudications.  See, e.g., id. at 32 (“When the 
 
MARTIN FINAL 5/20/2011  3:35 PM 
788 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
 An additional benefit of intermediate scrutiny is that it provides some 
scrutiny to challenged state actions.  This is in contrast to rational basis 
review, which “has been characterized as ‘virtually none in fact’ because 
nearly every law subject to it survives judicial scrutiny.”157  Because it 
requires the courts to engage in actual inquiry, intermediate scrutiny 
ensures greater accountability for the actions of the legislative and 
executive branches.158 
 Similarly, by requiring only some scrutiny, intermediate review 
provides more respect for the coordinate branches than strict scrutiny.159  
Adopting strict scrutiny to resolve one case can lead to unforeseen and 
potentially drastic results in the future.  As Judge Sutton hypothesizes in 
his article analyzing the Rodriguez decision: 
 Had Rodriguez applied strict scrutiny to educational spending, 
taxing and policy decisions, as the plaintiffs requested, the decision 
almost certainly would have spawned a host of unintended 
consequences.  The most obvious risk is that strict scrutiny would have 
presented too blunt an instrument to manage the calibrated policy 
choices that States and school districts must make in running a public 
school system.  If education were a fundamental right entitled to 
skeptical review, imagine the next generation of constitutional 
challenges: Strict scrutiny over curriculum choices?  Class size?  Class 
schedules?  Advanced Placement classes?  Membership on a sports 
team?  The possibilities are limitless.160 
Intermediate scrutiny avoids such bluntness. 
 While the flexibility of intermediate scrutiny makes it valuable to the 
courts, it is also a potential drawback.  Intermediate scrutiny is far from a 
bright-line standard, and variable articulations make the standard 
potentially difficult to apply.161  At times it seems like the most that can 
                                                                                                                       
right under examination is not determined to be fundamental and does not warrant middle-tier 
scrutiny, it is reviewed under a rational basis test.  This test requires the government to show that the 
objective of the statute was legitimate and bears a rational relationship to the classification used by 
the Legislature.” (emphasis added)). 
 157. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 718 (2007) 
(quoting Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). 
 158. See Usman, supra note 61, at 1522 (“A rational basis review is not adequate to address 
challenges arising under positive rights provisions, for such an approach ignores the question of 
whether the legislature has satisfied the constitutionally mandated objective, or is at least making 
efforts that can be expected to achieve its constitutional duty.”). 
 159. See id. at 1510 (“[S]trict scrutiny imposes an arduous burden on the political 
branches . . . .”). 
 160. Sutton, supra note 123, at 1980. 
 161. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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be definitively said is that intermediate scrutiny is simply “in between” 
rational basis review and strict scrutiny.162  Compounding the fuzziness 
of the standard is the variability of judicial review within all three tiers of 
scrutiny.163  In sum, intermediate scrutiny may not be an appropriate 
solution when a bright line or clear legal rule is the aim. 
 In the context of separation of powers, intermediate scrutiny poses 
the additional concern that the judiciary may potentially intrude upon the 
executive and legislative roles.164  Although it is undoubtedly the role of 
the courts “to say what the law is,”165 courts must necessarily avoid 
judicial legislating.  More rigorous forms of intermediate scrutiny—
when not justified by clear constitutional violations—may violate the 
principle of separation of powers.  Concomitantly, in requiring the 
government to articulate an important or significant reason for 
government action, application of intermediate scrutiny allows courts to 
operate as an effective bulwark against the exercise of putatively 
unconstitutional legislative and executive action.166 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Attorneys—and the clients they represent—ultimately determine the 
number and type of state constitutional cases heard by state supreme 
courts.  The growing reliance on state constitutional provisions leads to 
more interpretations of state constitutions that provide more precedent 
for future challenges, as can be seen in Stephenson and Blankenship.167  
Each state constitutional challenge requires the appellate courts to 
interpret the state constitution and precedent in new factual contexts, as 
can be seen by the resolution of the Leandro standard in King.168  In 
many of these state constitutional adjudications, intermediate scrutiny is 
a tool courts may use to resolve conflicts in the legal landscape.  Like 
                                                     
 162. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 164. See Usman, supra note 61, at 1523 (“A more rigorous review than federal rational basis 
analysis, however, raises well-founded concerns about removing issues and questions from the realm 
of self-government, and in doing so, eliminating citizen participation.”). 
 165. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 
at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“The interpretation of the laws is the proper 
and peculiar province of the courts.  A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as 
a fundamental law.  It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of 
any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.”). 
 166. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 167. See supra Part III.B. 
 168. See supra Part III.C. 
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any mechanism for legal analysis, intermediate scrutiny has its benefits 
and drawbacks.  Only time will tell whether state supreme courts will 
turn to intermediate scrutiny more frequently as they discharge their duty 
to interpret state constitutions. 
